Showing posts with label Learned. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Learned. Show all posts

Thursday, 2 April 2015

What The Kapors Have Learned From Years Of Working On Diversity in Tech

Almost one year ago, Google released its diversity data, kicking off a wide-ranging industry conversation about why tech companies and venture capital firms are so unrepresentative of the racial and gender make-up of the rest of the U.S.
Dozens of other companies followed Google’s suit while the issue of gender in the venture world has been on the front burner with the Ellen Pao and Kleiner Perkins verdict last Friday.
But Mitch and Freada Kapor have been here more or less all along. Mitch, who co-founded Lotus Development Corporation, which sold to Intel for $3.5 billion in 1995, and Freada, who has a Ph.D and has been active on the issue of diversity for years, run a venture firm Kapor Capital, math and science educational programs for students of color and are in the process of building a new center in Downtown Oakland around their ideas.
They shared some lessons from their work in an interview I did with them several weeks ago:
What would you say has changed about the diversity conversation since you started doing this kind of work?
Freada: What’s better is that we’re talking about it and we see it as an issue. Prior to Google releasing its numbers last May, it was nearly impossible to get any major tech company’s attention. And it still is nearly impossible to get any major Sand Hill Road VC firm’s attention, except Kleiner Perkins which has been sitting in court.
The numbers have gone up and down in terms of white women in computer science. But the numbers have never been anywhere but low for underrepresented people of color.
I’m hoping that what we have now that we didn’t have before is a new framework. I don’t mean that as gloss. I mean it as a deeper more nuanced and sophisticated understanding.
Not only is there a pipeline problem —
Actually, I was working on a story a month or so ago about East Palo Alto and I remember a woman who runs a well-regarded non-profit there telling me, “We don’t have a pipeline problem. We have an investment problem.” It struck me partly because the idea of a “pipeline problem” is repeated over and over. Yet it feels like this is also a way of abdicating responsibility, saying it’s the education system’s fault or whatever and therefore there’s not much really that any individual or company can do about it.
Freada: There is some substance to the pipeline problem issue. But I talk a lot about a “leaky pipeline” problem, which takes many forms — some of which have some layer of bias involved.
You have to look at all the drop-off points before you get into who gets to be a freshman computer science student. If you look at big school district level data, if you’ve failed 3rd grade math and you hit a certain absentee level in your freshman year, you can predict with almost certainty that a student is going to drop out of high school.
So what is it that we’re doing at 3rd grade math level? If someone is failing, can we do something to course correct? To write off a kid at third grade is just heart-breaking. These seem like points where we ought to be rallying, intervening and flipping the argument over its head.
But even with the pipeline problem, I do also think that you have to have an understanding of how bias operates.
What kinds of advice would you give to growth-stage tech companies thinking about diversity?

Freada: My first piece of advice is to stop thinking about yourself as a meritocracy.
Because if you believe you’re a meritocracy and you have numbers like everybody who has released their data, the implicit message is that Caucasian men are better than everyone else. Because that’s who is overrepresented. It’s endorsing a notion that these other people aren’t as good, and therefore that’s why there aren’t a ton of them.
Mitch: It’s a remarkable fact about people that we’re not consistent all the time. At one moment, a person can acknowledge how much they would like to have a diverse mix of employees. Then in another moment, they can also believe that it’s a genuine meritocracy where the best people and ideas get funded. To an extent, that’s what they like about Silicon Valley, its meritocratic nature. That is not completely wrong. It’s just wrong when it comes to matters of race and class.
Freada: Right. There was an MIT, Wharton and Harvard Business School study where they took a business plan that had already won a business plan competition. So we knew that it was investable.
Then they ran a controlled experiment where the same business plan videos were narrated by either male or female voices. When the same pitch was narrated by a male voice, the judges chose it 68 percent of the time.
I’ve been doing a lot of customized talks on hidden bias to help companies understand how — despite their best intentions — they may be making biased decisions anyways.
I try to come up with all kinds of practical steps to mitigate bias at the end of the talk. There are things you can do that are as simple as removing names from resumes.
Or a Rooney rule, [which the National Football League adopted more than a decade ago and requires teams to interview minority candidates for head coaching and senior football operations jobs. There’s no requirement that they hire these candidates, just that they include at least one in the interview process].
Or changing employee referral networks. When I ask if companies have employee referral networks, most say yes. But if I ask whether they’d have a structure for referrals of underrepresented groups, people often think that’s discriminatory and unfair.
They don’t think that having an employee referral system in a company with skewed numbers is by itself unfair. They think that getting to diversity that way is unfair.
Yeah, I understand. There was a profile of Tristan Walker last year in Fast Company and the journalist pointed out that if you’re recruiting from your friends, and they just happen to be more white or more male because people naturally gravitate towards people who are like them, that may be structurally racist even if there’s no deliberate or malicious intent to exclude people.
Freada: One of the things that I think doesn’t work, and we know this from earlier decades of work are things that can sounds like or feel like affirmative action. For a variety of reasons, those are seen as unfair. What happens is the candidates brought in through those mechanisms face all kinds of career limiting backlash
If you look at the law firm world, I remember in the early 1990s, every African-American associate that I interviewed at a top-tier law firm told me that affirmative action was the worst thing that happened to their careers. The automatic assumption is that you don’t “really” belong here. You’re not “really” qualified to be here. You’re only here because of affirmative action. I worry about seeing the same reactions today.
Mitch: There’s still a lot of lazy interviewing at tech companies like how many jelly beans does it take to fill a 747. Not only do they not get at anything, they are quite biased. Google has started to disavow them.
Freada likes to talk about the idea of “distance traveled.” Where did the candidate start from? What hurdles have they overcome?
How do you think about the term “culture fit” as a rationalization for including or excluding people?
Freada: I think there’s a lot of confusion about what’s a “need to have” and what’s a “nice to have.” It’s important to look at the dynamics of culture fit early.
One of my very favorite quotes is from Twilio’s Jeff Lawson. They, by the way, have one of the few diversity groups that is co-led by women engineers. To have engineering deeply involved in company diversity and inclusion efforts is critically important to getting it right and not having it be a side annoying thing.
Anyway, Jeff said something like, ‘When would it be a good time to think about diversity? When I’ve got 1,000 white, male engineers?’
It’s brilliant in its poignancy. Everyone has business fires to put out and if you don’t think about diversity as part of building a great company, you’re never going to prioritize it.
To understand the culture, you have to ask who succeeds here and why? That’s how you can begin to see if it might be inherently biased on the basis of gender or race.
Who do you think is a role model on this front?

Freada: Nobody’s figured it out. We have no one to point to in terms of demographic balance. But when we talk about companies making real efforts, Twilio is doing it in a very sincere way that’s completely consistent with their values. It’s also on their .org side.
It’s baked into the company as opposed to an afterthought. With their developer conference Signal, they reached out to us to figure out how to get a more diverse audience and put together a panel on it. It intersects all parts of their business.
What programs do you think are actually effective? There are lots of programs that Google and others have started to fund like Code2040, and then lots of regional or locally-focused organizations. Which ones are actually good?
Freada: A couple things. I’m trained as a researcher. I believe in rigorous evaluation. All of the groups ought to be looking at outcomes. The second thing is that we’re building a map of this “leaky pipeline” because we’ve got a bit of a herd mentality. There is way too much money going to hackathons teaching privileged girls how to code without any tie-in to anything else.
I understand the appeal of hackathons but it’s got to be connected to something — especially if you’re dealing with kids who are going to be the first in their families to go to college. You’ve got some responsibility to help them at different points of the pipeline too.
Then when I think about other organizations like Code2040, I think about the foundation world subsidizing some of the companies with the biggest market caps on the planet. They’re placing philanthropic dollars that are training underrepresented kids to be placed at Facebook, Google and Twitter. All of those are public companies which already have multi-billion dollars market caps.
Mitch: Of course, if you’re a startup and you’re hiring, you’ll want to hire people who have been at Google, Facebook and Twitter. Having those credentials is really important.
But what Freada is speaking to is when there are training programs for a cohort to be more inclusive, our view is that the host institution, whether that’s a Google or Facebook should be at the very least matching those philanthropic contributions if not going above them. They’re not making enough of an investment in developing these parts of the pipeline. And a lot of that money is coming from other philanthropic sources.
You run your own program, SMASH, for students of color in math and science. What did you learn from that?
Freada: We thought that if you could do a demonstration program to show that there’s a ton of talent and that if you created the opportunity, the kids would come. That was the point of SMASH.
We’re in a stage where there’s room for a lot of approaches. But what we want to talk about with a lot of well-intentioned people who aren’t starting their own programs is how to plug in the holes along the way. We’re mapping out all of the drop-off points so that as opposed to being the 400th person who funds a girls coding program, we can even out the dollars.
And then, we think it’s equally important to expose tech workers to these kids as it is for these kids to be exposed to math and science.
When we get engineers to come in and volunteer at SMASH’s hackathons, they all have the same reaction. They’re blown away by how smart and excited these kids are.
And we think, what? Did you really not think that black and brown boys and girls wouldn’t be as excited about a hackathon?
What about at the other end of the pipeline on the venture side?

Freada: What we’re trying to do at Kapor Capital is to show that you can invest in these communities and do well.
Mitch loves to talk about entrepreneurs building things that scratch their own itch. We talk about entrepreneurs like Frederick Hutson and Ana Roca-Castro who have built businesses.
Mitch: If you locked up John Doerr, Bill Gurley and Vinod Khosla in a room for a year, they could have never thought up what has become Pigeon.ly [Hutson’s startup] or Roca-Castro’s Plaza Familia. Their lived experience doesn’t include federal prison.
But both of these are first-rate businesses in terms of impact and in terms of what they’re going to be able to do financially. If you don’t have those folks at the table, those ideas aren’t going to get created, the beneficiaries of these services aren’t going to be helped, those jobs aren’t going to be created and the investors aren’t going to earn a return.
Are you going to share your returns to prove it?
Mitch: It takes seven to 10 years to prove out a venture strategy. We’re in about year four. I expect we will for better or for worse.
We are running the entire portfolio with the intent to fully reveal its internal performance. Even though it’s our money, we run it now as if there are external limited partners. I don’t mind making five-year forward-looking commitment to this.
How do you think about strategy in terms of being confrontational versus being more flexible in getting the industry to change? (It’s a classic tension in activism.)
Freada: I think there’s room for outsiders to be demanding and shaming. That’s an important role.
Mitch: But change can happen at other levels. Look at Y Combinator. Look at the regime change from Paul Graham to Sam Altman. There was this changing of the guard and now there’s a significantly greater commitment to diversity. It’s reflected in cohorts and in the non-profits and they’re blogging actively about this.
Y Combinator, which is like the Harvard or Stanford of accelerator programs, could have stayed as it wanted to. But they haven’t.
Look at Jessica Livingston. Look at how she’s speaking now. You won’t find her making speeches like this years ago.
The other thing to remember is the time scale upon which change happens. Because we’re in Silicon Valley, we’re so used to this accelerated Moore’s Law timeline because we’ve seen it so many times.
But when you look at for instance, the civil rights struggle, Selma was the culmination of a half-century of work. The NAACP was founded in 1909 and it took a half-century to get to Selma, which is the mid-way point. When we talk about what has and hasn’t changed, we need to think about the time frame upon which human institutions change.
It’s fine to be impatient. It’s one of the dilemmas of being human. But in the case of the big venture firms, they’re probably not going to change until the existing general partners retire.
Freada: People change more slowly than the the technologies they invent.
What do you think about other groups like the Rainbow Push Coalition, which has more of its historical roots in the civil rights movement. They went before the big tech companies at their shareholder meetings and demanded that diversity data be released before many companies actually did it.
Mitch: I’d say it’s necessary, but not sufficient. This playbook was used on Wall Street decades ago and it’s not clear that Wall Street is engaged in lasting change.
Freada: History is also being re-written about these tech companies that started releasing data last year. There is a whole crop of companies like HP, Cisco and Intel that have been releasing it all along.
Their numbers don’t necessarily look any better. Many companies have had had cheap diversity programs over the past 20 years. It’s a worthwhile question to ask about what’s broken with existing approaches to diversity.
I am an optimist. I wouldn’t be doing this work if I wasn’t. There are all of these young companies and people who are very eager to learn and start employee resources groups to focus on diversity.
But if you look at historic diversity programs, regardless of industry and company, they were fueled by a concern about being sued for discrimination. That’s not a positive motivator. That’s not a good business reason.
Last year’s effort on diversity numbers is a good thing. But it is still coming in response to external pressure. Journalists and outsiders have been persistent in asking for the numbers and what companies are doing to fix it.
But it needs to come from within. Twitter ought to be looking at who is using its product and how to mirror that customer base inside.
If you look at the Pew Internet studies on who uses products like Twitter, Pinterest or Facebook, do any of these companies look like their user bases?

Monday, 9 March 2015

What I’ve Learned About Deal Sourcing

Apple’s ‘Spring Forward’ Watch Event Live BlogEditor’s Note: Danielle Morrill is CEO of Mattermark, a company that provides research tools for startup investors.
I’ve spent the past two years selling to, building for, and raising from VCs. In this time, I have met with thousands of people who play various roles in the deal sourcing and dealmaking process, and I’ve learned a fair amount about the thinking behind sourcing deals. These are some of my observations.
The Art vs. the Science
Due to firm economics and succession, there is generally an “old guard” defending the art and a crop of associates and analysts fighting to bring the science to venture capital.
Most investors initially tell me they have so much inbound they can’t possibly need a tool that will help them source investment opportunities. Given the broad distribution of outcomes in VC, with many funds underperforming market benchmarks in 2014 according to Cambridge Associates, I challenge investors to ask themselves how their results are going to improve if their top-of-funnel doesn’t improve.
Few investors view the deal pipeline like a sales process, measuring conversion from one step to the next and iterating constantly to make it better. Some go through the motions of adopting a CRM system like Salesforce, RelateIQ or Pipedrive but few use CRM as the system of record for whether or not a “rep” gets paid.
Associates, especially those with little work experience beyond college internships and perhaps a stint as a founder, have very little context for how many meetings they need to take a week to source a deal. Successful professional calendar and email management skills aren’t taught in school, even business school, and I am surprised how often these people lament things have been too “crazy” to source proactively, because they’ve got 15 calls lined up this week.
Just to make this crystal clear: 15 is not a lot. A normal week for a sales person entails 30–40 calls of 30 minutes each, and this is table stakes. I do this much just time blocking 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. each day and doing back-to-back calls.
The traditional Monday partner meeting feels as outdated as the New York Times Page One review meeting, but few have taken steps to actually become the BuzzFeed of this metaphor. Some are thinking about it.
Pigeon Superstition
Once an investor has an impressive deal under their belt, they analyze the conditions of the deal and try to draw a correlation to non-essential things. Behavoiral psychologist B.F. Skinner describes this as “pigeon superstition.”
“Maybe I just need to keep doing (XYZ thing I was doing when I sourced that deal) and I’ll find more like that,” type thinking kicks in, and VCs start making exceptions for themselves or others, often as a rationalization for why someone doesn’t need to be contributing to deal sourcing in a methodical way, entering info into the CRM, taking more meetings and generally participating in the vetting process in the same way as others.
Justification for some cargo cult-like behavior which may or may not ever work again usually lasts less than a year and is then replaced with some new superstition. Some have gone so far as to turn these superstitions into their investment theses, and it seems to be a rising trend to rewrite a thesis on a quarterly basis, rather than sticking with some much deeper theme.
Investor insistence on “pattern matching” to justify irrational behavior is resilient, yet a command of truly objective data-driven pattern matching is still fairly unpopular with the old guard. This can be observed when favorite anecodotes of unicorn-sized wins are trotted out to justify the latest trend.
Warren Buffett captured this mentality perfectly when he wrote in his 2000 Chairman’s Letter:
The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs. Nothing sedates rationality like large doses of effortless money.
After a heady experience of that kind, normally sensible people drift into behavior akin to that of Cinderella at the ball. They know that overstaying the festivities — that is, continuing to speculate in companies that have gigantic valuations relative to the cash they are likely to generate in the future — will eventually bring on pumpkins and mice. But they nevertheless hate to miss a single minute of what is one helluva party. Therefore, the giddy participants all plan to leave just seconds before midnight. There’s a problem, though: They are dancing in a room in which the clocks have no hands.
Attribution, Brand and Ego
I used to look to understand VC at the firm level, but it has been helpful to realize firms are a collection of individuals with wildly different approaches and results.
There are big-name firms that bring a halo to partners with otherwise unimpressive personal track records; while firms with mediocre to poor results, or good results but a less flashy brand, boast several investors with stellar accomplishments who go relatively unknown.
As the ongoing Ellen Pao versus Kleiner Perkins trial has shown, it is rarely clear how to go from associate/analyst/principal to partner. Maybe you need to source one deal  —  or 10, sit on a couple boards, have one of your companies go public and you still might not get promoted. The people who are founding and/or senior partners in a VC firm aren’t necessarily interested in succession planning, even if their LPs want them to be. They’re also not necessarily great managers of other people.
Figuring out who sourced a deal in the deeply interconnected world of Silicon Valley is tough, and often quite political. Even in firms with flat economics, being seen as someone who can regularly bring in new opportunities in hot companies before any other firm sees them is the most important currency for promotion and long-term job security.
Risk
The biggest risk to VCs is missing the whale… or what people are now referring to as unicorns. This feels like the secret hiding in plain sight, the thing no one wants to talk about. This is where I think the greatest opportunity is… here are some of the ideas I’ve talked about with VCs when they ask me, “Okay Danielle, you have a strong opinion, how would you do my job? How would you find the next Uber?”
If I were a VC, with the tools available today (shameless pitch!) I would build a system for looking at everything and everyone that moves, globally. I would become a student of all emerging tools, both in consumer life and business life, and use them to do my work and augment my personal life. I would read voraciously like Charlie Munger, who said:
“In my whole life, I have known no wise people (over a broad subject matter area) who didn’t read all the time — none, zero. You’d be amazed at how much Warren reads — at how much I read. My children laugh at me. They think I’m a book with a couple of legs sticking out.”
I would stay young (at least at heart) and open to the world and let its trends flow around and through me in a Zen kind of way, delighting in the way it changes and how the things that look stupid or like silly toys often bring incredible happiness to people and become big businesses.
I would beware of the first time I tell those damn kids to turn their music down or get off my lawn. That is probably the moment when I’d embrace that I am joining the “old guard” and either need to fight back against that mentality or work to pass on my knowledge and method to my successors.
I would move to San Francisco to be part of the faster-moving and more global ecosystem we have here in the city, but avoid the temptation to become risk-averse and locked in to a certain level of income too early (read: no Atherton mansion, no San Francisco mansion, no horses, no private plane — at least until I am a billionaire ☺).
Instead of taking a large salary from fees, I would invest in the absolute best talent, tools and training for my successors. I would create short and medium-term cash bonus incentives to motivate sales-like behavior for things like meeting volume, qualified deals brought in beyond meeting one, and deals sourced. Since many associates and analysts won’t stay on to become partners and see the economic impact of an investment that takes 7–10 years to ripen in the best-case scenario, I’d create incentives that are less about “paying dues” and more about rewarding hustle every day.
I would get to know other investors, and build relationships that last beyond the immediate deal. I would crave the level of camaraderie with my VC peers that I enjoy with other founders, even as we compete for cash and customers. It’s still amazing to me how often I find two investors who I know would be fast friends and fantastic working together, and yet they’ve never met.
I humbly remind you I am not a VC. I have had the pleasure of learning about the industry these past two years through the eyes of my customers, and I hope these reflections resonate and continue the conversation about building the next generation of truly great startup investors.

 

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